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Statement of Jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction in this Court is proper under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 and Utah 
Constitution, Article VIII, Section 3. 
Issues Presented for Review 
The UGA is dissatisfied with the statement of the issues of North Salt Lake.1 Two of 
the major issues raised by North Salt Lake are: 1) whether the agreement between the parties 
was ultra vires and unenforceable; and 2) whether North Salt Lake breached the agreement 
because the time for its performance had not yet arrived. North Salt Lake takes the position 
that these issues are legal issues and are reviewed for correctness without deference to the 
decision of the trial court. 
However, these issues are affirmative defenses to the breach of contract action 
brought by the UGA. They address the liability of North Salt Lake under the agreement. 
This liability was the subject of the UGA's motion for summary judgment filed on May, 4, 
2000. The trial court issued a memorandum decision on July 14, 2000 determining that 
North Salt Lake breached the contact between the parties. 
North Salt Lake did not allege either of these affirmative defenses in its Answer and 
neither were they raised during the summary judgment proceeding on liability. It chose to 
wait for six months, until January 17,2001, to ask the court to reconsider its liability in light 
of these arguments that were raised for the first time. North Salt Lake also filed a new 
affidavit of the developer who originally conveyed the subject building lot with the deed 
1
 Both of the Appellants are jointly referred to herein as "North Salt Lake." 
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restrictions. North Salt Lake justified its delay in raising these affirmative defenses by 
claiming that the developer's willingness to lift the deed restrictions was newly discovered 
evidence. Yet, at the time North Salt Lake filed its motion for reconsideration and the 
developer's affidavit, witness exhibit lists for trial had already been exchanged pursuant to 
court order and the developer was not listed as a witness; the discovery cut-off was about to 
pass; and the court would shortly hold a telephone pre-trial conference setting the trial date. 
R. 237. 
The trial court determined that North Salt Lake's motion for reconsideration should 
not be granted based on the merits of its argument and also based upon the fact that North 
Salt Lake had plenty of opportunity to raise these affirmative defenses six months earlier, 
during the original summary judgment proceeding on liability and chose not to do so. R. 423 
& 424. The court determined that motions for reconsideration, to the extent that they exist, 
do not exist for the purpose of continually raising legal issues that should have been raised 
in an original motion. R. 424. The court's refusal to grant the motion for reconsideration 
under these circumstances should be measured by the abuse of discretion standard, rather 
than the de novo review standard proposed by North Salt Lake. Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 
1381, 1386 & 87 (Utah 1996); and Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1312 
(Utah 1994). 
The UGA has crossed appealed the issue of whether the trial court erred in declining 
to award its moving expenses incurred after it was evicted. The trial court determined that 
the UGA did not mitigate its damages because it should have signed a 20 year lease extension 
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and then sued North Salt Lake for its failure to convey the building lot. R. 443. Whether the 
duty to mitigate damages includes agreeing to the 20 year extension without the bargained 
for building lot is a conclusion of law and was so identified by the trial court. R. 529. The 
court found that but for the failure of North Salt Lake to convey the building lot, a 20 year 
extension to the lease would have been successfully negotiated. This was a factual finding, 
but the application of the doctrine of mitigation of damages to this finding was a conclusion 
of law that is reviewed for correctness. Lysenko v. Sawaya. 7 P.3d 783, 787 (Utah 2000). 
Determinative Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, Ordinances and Rules 
The case is based upon common law doctrines and principals of contract. There are 
no determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances or formal rules. 
Statement of the Case 
A. Nature of the case. 
This is a breach of contract action based upon the lease of office space to the UGA 
by North Salt Lake at the City's Eaglewood golf course club house. As an inducement for 
the UGA relocating its offices and the Utah Golf Hall of Fame to the club house and as an 
inducement to entering into the lease, North Salt Lake agreed to convey fee title to the UGA 
in an 18,975 square foot building lot that was just east of the club house parking lot, fronting 
on a residential street next to the adjacent, developing subdivision. The initial term of the 
lease was five years. In order to obtain the lot, the UGA had to sign a 20 year extension of 
the lease. 
As the end of the initial lease approached, the parties started negotiations for a long-
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term lease. During these negotiations, it became clear to the UGA that North Salt Lake did 
not hold fee title to the building lot, but held title subject to significant use restrictions that 
made it impossible to sell the lot to third parties. In addition, the lot was 17,768 square feet, 
not the 18,975 square feet that North Salt Lake was obligated to convey. The UGA stood 
ready to sign a 20 year lease but required the City to obtain release of the use restrictions and 
stand ready to deed "fee title" in the 18,975 square foot building lot to the UGA. North Salt 
Lake did not obtain release of the use restrictions on the lot and did not obtain the additional 
1,207 square feet that it agreed to convey. The initial lease expired and the UGA became a 
month-to-month tenant. Since the UGA would not enter into a new lease without fee title 
in a lot of correct size, North Salt Lake terminated the tenancy of the UGA and evicted it 
from the offices. 
B. Course of proceedings and disposition in the trial court. 
The UGA sued North Salt Lake for breach of the lease. On May 4, 2000, the UGA 
moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability. On July 14,2000, the trial court ruled 
that North Salt Lake breached the lease by not being able to transfer fee title in an 18,975 
square foot building lot to the UGA. R. 220. 
On November 9, 2000, the trial court issued a Notice of Telephone Conference that 
listed cut-off dates. R. 237. These dates included an exchange of witness and exhibit lists 
for trial by January 5, 2001, and a deposition cut-off of January 31, 2001. On January 17, 
2001, North Salt Lake moved for reconsideration of the summary judgment granted by the 
court six months earlier. The motion was based upon a new affidavit of the developer who 
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conveyed the building lot to North Salt Lake with the use restrictions. The developer was 
not listed as a witness on North Salt Lake's witness list. The UGA opposed the motion for 
reconsideration and moved to strike the affidavit. On May 15, 2001, the court denied the 
motion for reconsideration on the merits and also denied the motion because North Salt Lake 
failed to raise the issues at the time of the original summary judgment on liability. R. 421. 
Trial was held on May 30, 2001. R. 428. The court issued its findings of fact and 
conclusions of law on August 10,2001 and judgment on November 14,2001. R. 525 & 549. 
C. Statement of facts. 
1. The UGA is an organization representing amateur golf in the state of Utah. R. 
526. 
2. North Salt Lake is a municipal corporation. R. 526. 
3. The Municipal Building Authority is a municipal building authority created by 
North Salt Lake. R. 526. 
4. North Salt Lake and the Municipal Building Authority constructed the 
Eaglewood golf course and a club house. R. 526. 
5. On or about March 31, 1992, the parties entered into an agreement entitled 
"Office Use Agreement," referred to herein as the "Agreement." R. 526. 
6. The Agreement included a "First Addendum to Office Use Agreement," 
referred to herein as the "First Addendum." R. 526. 
7. On or about January 3, 1994, the parties executed a "Second Addendum to 
Office Use Agreement," referred to herein as the "Second Addendum." R. 526. 
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8. The parties agreed within the Agreement and the First Addendum that the UGA 
would lease its offices at the club house from North Salt Lake for a term of five years, and 
at the end of that term would enter into a 20 year lease at the base rent with a 3% cost of 
living increase for each year. The Second Addendum changed the amount of rent, to an 
amount agreed upon between the parties. R. 527, and Second Addendum, R. 34. 
9. As an inducement for the UGA relocating its offices and the Utah Golf Hall 
of Fame to the club house; as an inducement to entering into the agreements; and as an 
inducement to enter into a 20 year lease extension; North Salt Lake agreed to convey fee title 
to the UGA in an 18,975 square foot building lot that was just east of the club house parking 
lot, fronting on a residential street next to the adjacent, developing subdivision. R. 527. 
10. Unknown to the UGA and to North Salt Lake at the time of the Agreement and 
the Addendums, neither of the defendants owned fee title to the building lot. Title was 
conveyed to North Salt Lake in August of 1997, by Special Warranty Deed. The title 
conveyed to North Salt Lake was not "fee title", as represented in the First and Second 
Addendums. Rather, it contained significant restrictions to the use and transfer of the 
property. In addition, the size of the lot was 1,207 square fee smaller than the size of the lot 
that North Salt Lake was obligated to convey. R. 140, 157, 161 & 166. 
11. As the end of the initial lease approached, the parties started negotiations for 
a 20 year extension of the lease. R. 527. 
12. During these negotiations, it became clear to the UGA that North Salt Lake did 
not hold fee title to the building lot as represented in the First and Second Addendum, but 
13 
held title in a smaller lot, subject to significant use restrictions that made it impossible to sell 
the lot to third parties and obtain the highest value for the lot. R. 527. 
13. The UGA desired to exercise its rights under the First Addendum and enter into 
a 20 year extension of the lease. However, the UGA required the City to obtain release of 
the use restrictions in the deed and stand ready to deed "fee title" in the building lot to the 
UGA that could be marketable to third parties. R. 527. 
14. Between March, 1999 and December, 1999, the parties tried to resolve the 
problem caused by the use restrictions on the lot. R. 527. Also, see letters exchanged 
between the parties, trial exhibits 7-14. 
15. North Salt Lake did not obtain release of the use restrictions on the lot. R. 528. 
16. The initial term of the lease expired and the UGA became a month-to-month 
tenant. R. 528. 
17. North Salt Lake was agreeable to entering into an extension of the lease and 
continue to negotiate on the lot. The UGA required North Salt Lake to be able to convey the 
lot free and clear from the use restrictions before entering into a new lease. R. 528. See UGA 
letter of December 8, 1999, trial exhibit 13. 
18. But for the use restrictions on the lot, the parties would have successfully 
negotiated a 20-year extension. R. 528. 
19. Since the UGA would not enter into an extension of the lease without fee title 
in the lot, North Salt Lake terminated the month-to-month tenancy of the UGA and evicted 
the UGA from its offices on December 31, 1999. R. 528. 
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20. The UGA complied with the eviction notice and vacated its offices at the 
Eaglewood golf course. R. 528. 
21. The UGA incurred costs in moving its offices, salaries for employees involved 
with the move, expenses associated with relocating its telephone system, costs of new 
stationary with a new address, and miscellaneous expenses associated with the move, 
primarily the cost of items that had to be left at the club house or could not be used at the 
UGA's new site. R. 528. 
22. The moving expenses totaled $4,087.27, and are set forth on the statements 
from Mesa Moving and Storage and Midwest Office. Trial exhibit 19. The cost of moving 
the telephone system totaled $2,102.69, and is set forth within the statements from Western 
Communications. Trial exhibit 19. The cost of printing new stationary, envelopes, cards and 
other necessary items totaled $4,815.53, and is set forth in the statements from Production 
Graphics. Trial exhibit 19. These costs total $11,005.49. 
Summary of the Argument 
1. It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny the untimely motion 
for reconsideration. The motion was based upon two affirmative defenses that were not 
raised in the original answer or in the first summary judgment proceeding that directly 
addressed the issue of liability which was at the heart of these defenses. 
2. The promise to convey the building lot to the UGA was a major part of the 
agreement between the parties. It was supported by consideration and was not an 
unenforceable gift of municipal property. 
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3. The City owned the building lot and had full power and authority to convey the 
lot to the UGA. The Municipal Building Authority also had full power and authority to 
convey the lot to the UGA, but this issue is irrelevant because it never owned the lot. 
4. North Salt Lake breached the contract by misrepresenting that it owned the 
building lot when it did not own the lot, by not conveying the lot when the UGA stood ready 
and willing to enter into a lease extension, by telling the UGA that it had to sign a lease 
extension and then deal with the developer to obtain clear, fee title to the lot, and by evicting 
the UGA when the UGA told it to perform its part of the contract and convey the lot. 
5. The UGA was released from its duty to enter into a 20 year lease extension 
because of North Salt Lake's breach of the agreement. 
6. The First Addendum controlled the rent terms of the 20 year extension and the 
Second Addendum was an unenforceable agreement to agree because it provided that the 
City could charge whatever it wanted for rent during the extension. 
7. By awarding the UGA damages in the amount of the fair market value of the 
building lot, the trial court put the parties in the same position as if the contract to convey fee 
title in the lot had been fully performed. This was the correct measure of damages. 
8. The trial court erred in not awarding the UGA its costs of moving caused by 
its wrongful eviction. 
Argument 
A. The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion by Denying North Salt Lake's 
Motion for Reconsideration. 
On May 4, 2000, the UGA moved the trial court for summary judgment on liability 
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for breach of contract. R. 99. North Salt Lake opposed the motion. R. 164. The court 
announced its decision on July 14, 2000, granting the motion for summary judgment on 
liability. R. 220. The UGA certified the case for trial on October 4, 2000. R. 229. On 
November 9, 2000, the court set cut off dates. R. 237. The cut off date for the witness list 
and exhibit list for trial was January 5, 2001. Id. The cut off date for depositions was 
January 31, 2001. W. 
On January 17, 2001, North Salt Lake moved for reconsideration of the court's 
decision on summary judgment on liability. R. 253. This was six months after the initial 
decision on liability, and the motion was filed after the witness list and exhibit list for the 
trial were exchanged and only two weeks before the deposition cut off. 
The motion for reconsideration raised two new issues: 1) the lease was ultra vires and 
not enforceable; and 2) the accompanying affidavit of the developer indicated that she would 
have conveyed fee title to the UGA Property if the City would have only asked, which meant 
that the City could have performed and conveyed fee title at the time the UGA signed a 20 
year lease extension. R. 253. Both of these defenses were affirmative defenses to liability 
that should have been raised six months earlier at the time of the initial summary judgment 
proceeding on liability. North Salt Lake chose to not raise them at the earlier date. 
The new witness, the developer, had no relevant evidence to add to the court's 
decision on liability. She was not even on the City's witness list for trial. R. 241. Her 
affidavit simply states that she would have conveyed fee title to the UGA Property to the City 
if it would have simply asked. R. 320. However, the affidavit did not change the fact that: 
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1) North Salt Lake represented that it held fee title in the UGA property in the written 
documents, which representation was false, R. 27; 2) the primary inducement to the UGA to 
leave its corporate offices and relocate to the City's Eaglewood golf course was the promise 
of fee title in the Property, R. 27 & 527; 3) prior to expiration of the initial term of the lease, 
the parties discovered that North Salt Lake did not have fee title in the UGA Property, R. 
527; 4) Between March, 1999, and December, 1999, the parties attempted to negotiate a 
resolution to the problem, R. 527 and letters between the parties, trial exhibits 7 - 14; 5) 
North Salt Lake did not obtain fee title in the Property, R. 528, and Special Warranty Deed 
from the developer, R. 140; 6) the City took the position that it would not meet its contractual 
obligation and obtain fee title for the UGA and it was the UGA's responsibility to go to the 
developer and obtain fee title, Transcript of trial testimony of Scott Gardner, North Salt Lake 
Director of Golf and Recreation, p. 94, R. 565; and testimony of Colin Wood, North Salt 
Lake City Manager, p. 131, R. 565; 7) the UGA stood ready and willing to sign a 20 year 
lease extension R.528, and UGA letter of December 8,1999, trial exhibit 13; and 8) the City 
evicted the UGA when the UGA continued to demand that the City perform its contractual 
obligation and convey fee title to the UGA Property, R. 528 and eviction notice, trial exhibit 
15.2 
A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to reconsider a summary judgment 
2
 The affidavit is suspect. Why would the developer change her mind and state 
that she would have conveyed the UGA Property in fee, without use restrictions, when 
she conveyed it to the City in 1997 with carefully worded use restrictions that prevented 
the UGA from reselling the property? The UGA has since been evicted and cannot take 
advantage of the developer's change of heart. Further, the developer has not lifted the 
deed restrictions and they exist today. She only states that she would have. 
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is within the discretion of the trial court, and this court will not disturb the decision absent 
an abuse of discretion. Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381,1386 & 87 (Utah 1996). The trial 
court determined that North Salt Lake's new legal arguments were affirmative defenses to 
the original summary judgment and could have and should have been raised at that time. R. 
423 & 24. The court also agreed with the UGA that the affidavit of the developer should be 
stricken. R. 422. The fact raised by the developer in her affidavit that she would have 
released the deed restrictions if the City had only asked did not change the fact that North 
Salt Lake made no effort to obtain such a release, told the UGA that it had to deal with the 
developer and then evicted the UGA when the City could not provide fee title. Further, the 
affidavit does not address the fact that the lot was short 1,207 square feet from the lot agreed 
to be conveyed. The developer's affidavit was something that could have been obtained for 
the first summary judgment six months earlier, and its content was irrelevant. 
The court should sustain the trial court's decision to not reconsider the summary 
judgment based upon the arguments that the lease was ultra vires and that the developer 
would have lifted the deed restrictions. The trial court also ruled that these arguments failed 
on the merits. R. 424 & 25. If this court decides to consider these issues on the merits, the 
UGA has briefed them below. 
B. North Salt Lake and the Municipal Building Authority Waived the Defenses that 
the Agreement was Ultra Vires and that the Developer would Convey Fee Title 
to the UGA Property. 
North Salt Lake and the Municipal Building Authority answered the complaint on 
February 29, 2000, but did not raise the two legal issues that they presented in their motion 
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for reconsideration as affirmative defenses under Rules 12(b) and 8(c) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Rule 12(b) provides that any defense shall be asserted in a responsive 
pleading. Rule 8(c) provides that a responsive pleading must set forth any matter 
"constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense." The defenses that the agreement was 
ultra vires and that the developer would have conveyed the UGA Property free of the use 
restrictions were clearly "affirmative defenses" and an "avoidance" because they deny 
liability not because the allegations of the complaint are not true, but because the legislature 
and the Utah Constitution are alleged to have prohibited such contracts as ultra vires and 
because the developer is claimed to have stood ready to convey fee title to North Salt Lake. 
Therefore, to preserve these defenses, they had to be raised in the defendants' answer. 
Golding v. Ashley Central Irrigation Co.. 793 P.2d 897, 899 (Utah 1990). They were not 
raised as affirmative defenses and the UGA objected to North Salt Lake raising them in its 
motion for reconsideration. The UGA also moved to have them and the affidavit of the 
developer stricken. 
Not only were they not raised as affirmative defenses, the defendants affirmatively 
alleged in their Answer that their execution of the documents was "taken under proper 
authority of law." Answer, Third Defense, R. 95. The defendants clearly waived their right 
to assert the ultra vires argument by not raising it as an affirmative defense and also by 
expressly disclaiming the defense in the Answer. 
C. The Agreement Requiring North Salt Lake and its Municipal Building Authority 
to Convey the Building Lot was not an Unenforceable Gift. 
North Salt Lake argues that the agreement to convey the fee title in the UGA Property, 
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the building lot, was a gift, and therefore an unenforceable ultra vires agreement. The 
conveyance of fee title was not a gift. It was, rather, part of a lease with the UGA, which is 
the oldest and largest organization of amateur golfers in the state of Utah and Utah's 
representative with the United States Golf Association, the governing body of the sport. 
This agreement is a complete package and cannot be divided into parts. North Salt 
Lake, however, argues that it should be divided into two parts that are distinct from each 
other and designed to exist on their own. North Salt Lake argues that the first portion is the 
lease of the UGA office space and the second portion is the agreement to convey the building 
lot, which North Salt Lake calls a "gift." 
The Office Use Agreement and the First Addendum were signed at the same time, 
March of 1992, before the club house was constructed. The basic purpose of the Agreement 
was lease of office space to the UGA for five years with payment of $30,300.00 annual rent. 
R. 11 & 12. To induce the UGA to leave its current offices and move its operations to North 
Salt Lake's Eaglewood club house, the City also agreed: 
1. To lease an additional 888 square feet at no cost to house the Utah Golf Hall 
ofFame(R.27); 
2. To allow the UGA to hold two weekday tournaments each year and not charge 
greens fees or cart fees for the tournaments (R. 27); 
3. To allow the UGA to use the driving range without charge for two hours per 
week to train junior golfers (R. 27); and 
4. To convey fee title in an adjacent 18,975 square foot building lot to the UGA 
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that was expressly designated in the documents as the "UGA Property" (R. 27 & 28).3 
North Salt Lake now designates these items as "freebies" in its brief. However, they 
were never called "freebies" by the parties in the documents or in their testimony. They were 
an integral part of the Agreement, without which the UGA would not have relocated or 
agreed to pay rent to North Salt Lake. 
If North Salt Lake can convince the Court that these items were not part of the lease, 
but were "freebies", then it hopes that such "freebies" will be ultra vires under Article VI, 
§ 29 of the Utah Constitution and the cases of Sears v. Ogden City, 553 P.2d 118 (Utah 
1975); Municipal Building Authority of Iron County v. Lowder. 711 P.2d 273 (Utah 1985); 
and Salt Lake County Commission v. Short, 985 P.2d 899 (Utah 1999). However, each of 
these cases dealt with actual gifts of municipal assets. The Sears case involved the gift of 
city land to the local school district. The Lowder case addressed the gift of a county jail. 
The Short case concerned cash contributions to charities. None of these cases involved the 
bargained for exchange of property and lease of office space for the agreement to relocate 
an organization's operations and the payment of $25,000.00 per year in rent. 
1. Public Policy requires that North Salt Lake not be allowed to escape its 
obligation to honor the agreement with the UGA. 
The contract that is at issue is a detailed written agreement that was negotiated 
3
 The Second Addendum to Office Use Agreement was signed two years later, after the 
club house was built. R. 31. Since the final design of the club house was changed during the 
construction, the amount of space leased by the UGA was reduced slightly and the rent was 
reduced to $25,000.00 per year. R. 31 & 32. The Second Addendum also allowed the City to 
share in any income from the UGA's two annual tournaments and driving range use. R. 33. The 
Second Addendum retained the duty to convey the UGA Property to the UGA, but changed the 
agreement concerning the amount of rent for future extensions of the lease. R. 34. 
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between North Salt Lake and the UGA over several months. Both of the parties were happy 
with its terms. Thus, they signed it. After five years of both party's performance under the 
contract, North Salt Lake discovered that it did not own fee title to the UGA Property and 
could not perform its agreement to convey such fee title. It started looking for ways to 
escape its obligations under the agreement. See affidavit of North Salt Lake Mayor James 
W. Dixon, para. 8 & 9, R. 161. North Salt Lake also discovered that it could obtain higher 
rent than the rent that the UGA was obligated to pay. See p. 23, note 2 of North Salt Lake 
brief. North Salt Lake breached the agreement by refusing to convey the UGA Property, 
evicted the UGA and rented the office space to third parties for increased rent. North Salt 
Lake now attacks the contract as ultra vires and asks this Court to absolve it of liability for 
its breach of the lease. 
In each of the three cases cited by North Salt Lake, the government parties to the 
contracts or gifts supported the contracts or gifts. In the Sears case, Ogden City favored the 
gift of the real property to the school district. Sears v. Ogden City, 553 P.2d at 118. 
Likewise, in the Lowder case, the Iron County Municipal Building Authority sought a 
declaratory judgment to validate the transaction that included a gift of the old county jail. 
Municipal Building Authority of Iron County v. Lowder. 711 P.2d at 275. In Short, the 
charitable contributions were supported by the Salt Lake County Commission who made the 
contributions. Salt Lake County Commission v. Short. 985 P.2d at 900. In each case, the 
gifts were challenged by third parties to the gifts or contracts. 
In the present case, the lease is not being challenged by third parties. It is being 
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attacked by North Salt Lake, the party who misrepresented its ownership in the UGA 
Property, the party who could not perform under the lease because it did not own fee title in 
the Property, and the party who wanted to evict the UGA so that it could rent the office space 
for more than the UGA was obligated to pay. 
This Court recently addressed an arm's length transaction between a state agency and 
a private company where the state agency, not a third party, attacked the contract and 
attempted to use Article VI, § 29 of the Utah Constitution to disavow the agreement and its 
duty to pay the private company. Health Services Group, Inc. v. Utah Department of Health. 
40 P.3d 591 (Utah 2002). The state agency failed. Id. at 599. The Court upheld the contract 
and the obligation of the state agency to perform under the contract. Id. 
The Court should, likewise, deny North Salt Lake's attempt to back out of its 
agreement with the UGA. To allow North Salt Lake to walk from its obligations under the 
agreement would set a precedent that a contract with a municipality can be ignored if the 
municipality subsequently changes its mind and does not like the terms of the contract. 
2. There was consideration to support the Agreement. 
North Salt Lake argues that there was no consideration for the agreement to convey 
the UGA Property. In support of this argument, it reasons that the $150,000.00 in rent that 
the UGA paid over the six years that it occupied the club house was only consideration for 
the lease of the office space. The UGA would have paid an additional $640,000.00 in rent 
over the extended 20 year life of the lease if North Salt Lake would not have breached the 
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lease and evicted the UGA.4 
North Salt Lake ignores the fact that the contract is one agreement. The parties 
recognized in the body of the agreement that it was a tremendous undertaking for the UGA 
to leave its offices in Salt Lake City and move its operations to North Salt Lake. The First 
and Second Addendums to the Office Use Agreement clearly state in several paragraphs that 
North Salt Lake agreed to a number of inducements to convince the UGA to go to the effort 
and expense of moving its operations. R. 27 & 32. Some inducements were minor, such as 
the right to use the driving range for two hours per week for a junior golf program. One 
inducement, the obligation of North Salt Lake to convey fee title in the UGA Property, was 
major and without it the UGA would not have entered into the lease. 
In order for a transfer of municipal property to meet the requirements of Article VI, 
Section 29 of the Utah Constitution, the transfer must be "in good faith and for adequate 
consideration." Sears v. Ogden City, 553 P.2d at 119; Municipal Building Authority of Iron 
County v. Lowder, 711 P.2d at 282; and Salt Lake County Commission v. Short, 985 P.2d 
at 909. The UGA lease was negotiated over several months. There is no evidence that it was 
not in good faith. 
4
 North Salt Lake points out that after it decided to evict the UGA, it was able to lease the 
office space for more than the UGA was paying. This argument demonstrates the little 
importance that North Salt Lake places on written contracts. North Salt Lake misrepresented in 
the written documents that it owned fee title in the UGA lot. It could not convey the lot when the 
UGA stood ready to enter into a lease extension. North Salt Lake resolved this problem by 
evicting the UGA. North Salt Lake then rented the office space for more than the UGA was 
paying and now argues that this was evidence that the UGA paid no consideration for the 
conveyance of the UGA lot. This is evidence of how little the written contract meant to North 
Salt Lake. 
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North Salt Lake admits that there was consideration for the lease, but takes the 
position that these cases require something more than the consideration that would support 
contracts between private parties. These cases do not support this position. The reason that 
the charitable gifts were rejected in Short was that they were outright gifts. Salt Lake County 
argued that the charitable organizations benefited the County. Salt Lake County Commission 
v. Short, 985 P.2d at 910. This Court held that the benefits were too speculative to support 
the gifts and that the benefits must be specifically identified. Id. The reason that the gift of 
the land failed in Sears was because the gift was simply that, a gift, with no evidence of 
specific benefits flowing from the gift. The reason that the gift of the county jail failed in 
Lowder was that it was an outright gift given the fact that the County's right to reacquire the 
jail was 20 years down the road and there was a good chance that the right would not exist 
at that point in time under the terms of the contract. Municipal Building Authority of Iron 
County v. Lowder. 711 P.2dat282. 
This Court considered the level of consideration necessary to support a contract with 
a government agency in Healthcare Services Group, Inc. and determined that there is no 
higher threshold of consideration in a contract with the government than there is in contracts 
between private entities. Health Services Group, Inc. v. Utah Department of Health, 40 P. 3d 
at 596. The Court stated: 
"Consideration is present when there is an act or promise given in exchange 
for the other party's promise. Thus, there is consideration whenever a promisor 
receives a benefit or where a promisee suffers a detriment, however slight." 
[Citations omitted.] 
Id. 
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The detriment suffered by the UGA and the benefit received by North Salt Lake were 
not "slight." North Salt Lake obtained a tenant of good reputation in the golfing community, 
was paid $150,000.00 over six years and would have been paid another $640,000.00 for a 
20 year extension of the lease, had it not decided to solve its problem with the UGA Property 
by evicting the UGA. The UGA suffered the detriment of moving its operations to the 
Eaglewood club house, paying $150,000.00 over six years, losing the contracted UGA 
Property, losing what North Salt Lake claims was a below market lease, and then being 
forced to move its operations a second time when it was evicted. 
D. The Conveyance of the UGA Property was not Ultra Vires. 
North Salt Lake argues that the agreement was ultra vires because the Building 
Authority did not have the power to convey the UGA Property under the Utah Municipal 
Building Authority Act, Title, 17A, Chapter 3, or the Utah Code. 
1. The City owned the UGA Property and had full power and authority to 
convey the property. 
The Building Authority never owned the UGA Property and North Salt Lake never 
believed that the property would be owned by the Building Authority. North Salt Lake's 
Mayor attested that he believed that the property was owned by the City at the time the 
Agreement with the UGA was executed. R. 161. Several years later, it was discovered that 
the property had not been deeded to the City and a Special Warranty Deed was obtained from 
the developer conveying the property to the City, not to the Building Authority. R. 161 and 
Special Warranty Deed, R. 140. The City, not the Building Authority, has continued to own 
the lot. 
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During the year's negotiations that took place between the City and the UGA whereby 
the parties sought a means to solve the problem caused by the use restrictions that the 
developer wrote into the Special Warranty Deed, the City never once claimed the Municipal 
Building Authority owned the property and its conveyance would be ultra vires to the powers 
of the Building Authority. See April 28, 1999 letter of North Salt Lake City Attorney; "the 
City's obligation to convey the property to the UGA;" and "the City shall transfer all right, 
title and interest the City owns in the property to the UGA". R. 145 and Exhibit 7, trial 
exhibits. See September 8, 1999 letter of City Attorney acknowledging the interest of the 
UGA in the building lot and the City's duty to reacquire the lot. Exhibit 8, trial exhibits. 
Even after being sued, the defendants affirmatively alleged that they had full authority under 
the law to enter into the obligations within the agreement. North Salt Lake Answer, Third 
Defense, R. 95. 
North Salt Lake never intended that the UGA Property would be part of the golf 
course project that was the purpose of North Salt Lake's Municipal Building Authority. The 
City received the Special Warranty Deed in September, 1997. The sole purpose of the UGA 
Property was to fulfill the duty of North Salt Lake to convey the lot to the UGA in order to 
meet its contractual obligations under the Agreement. The golf course had been funded, 
designed, constructed, planted and was "growing in" in 1993, four years before the UGA 
Property was deeded to the City. Testimony of Scott Gardner, North Salt Lake's Director of 
Golf, transcript of trial, at 74. R. 565. 
The first time that the City raised the argument that the Building Authority, rather than 
28 
North Salt Lake, owned the UGA Property was shortly before trial when the City asked the 
trial court to reconsider its prior summary judgment on liability that had been granted six 
months earlier. 
2. Both the City and the Municipal Building Authority had the power to 
convey the building lot to the UGA. 
The City had the power to contract and the power to purchase, hold and dispose of real 
property. Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-1-202 and 10-8-2. The Building Authority had the 
authority to acquire and hold property by any lawful means, including by "exchange," by 
"purchase," by "sale," and by "lease." Utah Code Ann. § 17A-3-902(l). If the UGA 
Property was part of the Municipal Building Authority project, both the City and the 
Municipal Building Authority had the express authority to enter into a lease agreement with 
the UGA that resulted in the rental of office space at the club house. This express authority 
included the "sale" or conveyance of the building lot as an integral part of the lease. 
The Building Authority also had the express authority to take actions to "acquire," 
"improve," and "extend" the project. Utah Code Ann. §§ 17A-3-902(3) & 17A-3-903(l). 
Improving and extending a project may require the conveyance of certain portions of the 
project and acquisition of other areas of property in order to meet the shape, design, and 
purpose of the project. Improving a project could require the promise of a building lot to a 
recognized golf association in order to induce the association to incur the cost and effort to 
move its operations to the City's golf course. 
The authority of the Building Authority also included the implied authority to take the 
necessary actions and enter into the necessary agreements to complete and operate the 
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Building Authority project. Nothing in the Municipal Building Authority Act proscribed the 
Building Authority from making the promises that it made to the UGA. Indeed the Building 
Authority was a nonprofit corporation. Utah Code Ann. § 17A-3-903. Nonprofit 
corporations have the express authority to contract and acquire, hold and convey real 
property. Utah Code Ann. § 16-6a-302. 
Both the express and implied authority of the Building Authority must be read in light 
of the Legislature's directive that the Municipal Building Authority Act is "supplemental to 
all existing laws relating to the acquisition, use, maintenance, or operation of projects by 
public bodies," including the authority of the City to execute the Agreement with the UGA 
and its duty to convey fee title in the UGA Property. Utah Code Ann. § 17A-3-914. The 
Legislature also recognized that the Act had to be "liberally construed" so that the Building 
Authority and the City could develop the projects authorized by the Act. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 17A-3-917. 
E. North Salt Lake Breached the Agreement. 
The First Addendum gave the UGA two choices concerning the UGA property. The 
UGA could either elect to build its offices on the property or it could elect to not construct 
its offices on the property. First Addendum, para.4 & 5; R. 28. If it chose to build its offices, 
it had to give written notice of that election to North Salt Lake and provide copies of the 
plans for the offices. First Addendum, para.4. If North Salt Lake approved the plans, the 
building lot had to be conveyed to the UGA. Id. 
If the UGA chose to not build its offices on the UGA property, then it had to enter into 
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a 20 year extension of the lease of its present office space at the same base rent with an 
annual cost of living increase of 3% per year. First Addendum, para. 5. If the 20 year 
extension was entered into, fee title in the lot had to be conveyed to the UGA. Id. 
As the end of the initial lease approached, the parties started negotiations for a long 
term lease. Findings of Fact; R. 527. The UGA desired to exercise its rights under the First 
Addendum and enter into a 20 year extension. Id. During the negotiations, it became clear 
that North Salt Lake did not hold title to the subject lot that would make it marketable to third 
parties because of the use restrictions in the deed to North Salt Lake from the original 
developer. Id. The UGA required the City to obtain release of the use restrictions and stand 
ready to deed "fee title" in a lot of 18,975 square feet, not 17,768 square feet, that could be 
marketable to third parties. Id. 
Between March, 1999, and December, 1999, the parties tried to resolve the problem 
caused by North Salt Lake's inability to convey such a lot. Findings of Fact; R. 527. North 
Salt Lake did not obtain release of the use restrictions. Findings of Fact; R. 528. The initial 
lease expired and the UGA became a month-to-month tenant. Id. The UGA continued to 
require North Salt Lake to be able to convey fee title, free and clear from the use restrictions 
before entering into a new lease. Id- North Salt Lake took the position that the UGA should 
sign a 20 year extension of the lease, not receive the fee title in the lot, and then take it on 
itself to go to the developer and negotiate the fee title that North Salt Lake was obligated to 
provide. Transcript of trial testimony of Scott Gardner, North Salt Lake Director of Golf and 
Recreation, p. 94, R. 565; and testimony of Colin Wood, North Salt Lake City Manager, p. 
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131, R. 565. 
The trial court found that but for the inability of North Salt Lake to convey fee title 
of an 18, 975 square foot lot, free and clear from the use restrictions, a 20 year extension to 
the lease would have been negotiated. Findings of Fact; R. 528. The UGA stood ready to 
perform its part of the Agreement and enter into a 20 year extension. The UGA's letter of 
December 8, 1999 made that fact clear. R. 148. All that the UGA required was that North 
Salt Lake perform its part of the agreement by conveying fee title in the lot in return for the 
20 year extension. North Salt Lake simply refused to meet its part of the agreement and 
convey fee title. It could not do so. It did not own fee title. North Salt Lake ignored its 
obligations under the Agreement and told the UGA that it had to approach the developer and 
clear up the problem and negotiate fee title to the lot. The City solved the problem by 
terminating the tenancy and evicting the UGA. 
This was a clear breach of the agreement. It was time to perform and the City refused 
to do so. The trial court called the breach an anticipatory breach which excused the UGA's 
performance of entering into a 20 year extension of the lease. R. 222. An anticipatory 
breach occurs when a party to an executory contract manifests a positive and unequivocal 
intent to not render its promised performance when the time arrives to perform. Hurwitz v. 
DavidK. Richards Co., 436, P.2d 794,796 (Utah 1968); and Breuer-Harrison. Inc. v. Combe. 
799 P.2d 716, 724 (Utah Ct. of App. 1990). See also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 
253 (1977). 
Upon the City's breach, the UGA had three options: 1) treat the entire contract as 
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broken and sue for damages; 2) treat the contract as still binding and wait until the time 
arrived for its performance and at such time bring an action on the contract; 3) Rescind the 
contract and sue for money paid or for the value of the services or property furnished. 
Hurwitz v. David K. Richards Co., 436, P.2d at 796; and Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe. 
799 P.2d at 724, n. 4. The UGA chose the first remedy, treated the contract as broken and 
sued for the damages of the lost market value of the lot and its costs of moving. The trial 
court awarded the market value of the lot, but denied the costs of moving. 
1. The time arrived for North Salt Lake to perform and stand ready to 
convey fee title, which North Salt Lake could not do. 
The UGA does not argue with the doctrine that a seller of real property has a duty to 
convey title at the time conveyance is required under the contract. Neves v. Wright, 63 8 P.2d 
1195, 1198 (Utah 1981). However, North Salt Lake's argument that this doctrine absolves 
it from liability misses one small part of the doctrine. The time had arrived to convey the lot. 
The UGA stood ready to enter into a 20 year extension of the lease. R. 527 & 528 and UGA 
letter of December 3,1999, trial exhibit 13. North Salt Lake could not perform its part of the 
agreement and convey fee title in the UGA property because it never owned such fee title 
even though it represented in the documents that it did. R. 527 & 528, and Special Warranty 
Deed to North Salt Lake from developer, R. 140. Further, the City made no effort to obtain 
fee title. The UGA told North Salt Lake on numerous occasions that it had to be able to 
convey fee title, free and clear from the use restrictions before the UGA would enter into a 
new lease. R. 527 & 528 and letters exchanged between North Salt Lake and the UGA, trial 
exhibits 7-14. North Salt Lake simply refused to solve the problem and go to the developer 
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and obtain fee title in a 18,975 square foot lot. Instead, the City took the position that the 
UGA should sign a 20 year lease, not receive the fee title in the lot, and then take it upon 
itself to go to the developer and negotiate the fee title that North Salt Lake could not provide 
and would not obtain. Transcript of trial testimony of Scott Gardner, North Salt Lake 
Director of Golf and Recreation, p. 94, R. 565; and testimony of Colin Wood, North Salt 
Lake City Manager, p. 131, R. 565. 
The trial court found that but for the inability of North Salt Lake to convey fee title, 
free and clear from the use restrictions, a 20 year lease would have been negotiated. Findings 
of Fact; R. 528. In order to resolve the problem, North Salt Lake terminated the tenancy of 
the UGA and evicted the UGA from its offices on December 31, 1999. Id. Over one year 
after North Salt Lake evicted the UGA, the City obtained an affidavit from the developer that 
attested that she would have removed the use restrictions if the City had simply asked. 
R.320. This affidavit was suspect and late, and was stricken by the court.5 It was obtained 
by the City in an attempt to convince the trial court to change its decision of six months 
earlier that the City had breached the Agreement by not being able to convey fee title in the 
UGA Property. At that time, the UGA had already been evicted and this lawsuit was about 
to go to trial on the issue of damages. 
2. The anticipatory breach of the Agreement by North Salt Lake relieved the 
UGA of the requirement of a 20 year lease extension. 
North Salt Lake argues that the UGA had to agree to a 20 year lease on rent terms 
5
 The court should note that the developer never released the deed restrictions. They exist 
today. The developer only said that she would. 
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acceptable to North Salt Lake before it had a duty to convey the UGA Property. North Salt 
Lake reasons that the UGA had to negotiate with the developer to obtain the UGA Property 
free and clear of the use restrictions even though the City was obligated to convey fee title 
to the Property. Transcript of trial testimony of Scott Gardner, North Salt Lake Director of 
Golf and Recreation, p. 94, R. 565; and testimony of Colin Wood, North Salt Lake City 
Manager, p. 131, R. 565. When the UGA refused to accept such a lease, North Salt Lake 
evicted the UGA. 
The trial court recognized that North Salt Lake's argument was simply an escape route 
designed to absolve it from its breach of the Agreement. The trial court reasoned that under 
certain conditions, an anticipatory breach of a contract excuses the other party from 
performing conditions precedent, such as entering into a 20 year lease. R. 222. The trial 
court construed the Agreement to be that North Salt Lake promised unrestricted fee title to 
an 18,975 square foot lot. R. 222 & 23. North Salt Lake had plenty of opportunity to 
provide such title, but could not. Id. The UGA demanded such title and stood ready to enter 
into a 20 year lease. Id. North Salt Lake refused to convey fee title to such a lot because it 
did not have such title and eventually solved the problem by evicting the UGA. The court 
concluded that this was an anticipatory breach of the Agreement. Id. 
An anticipatory breach will generally excuse the nonoccurrence of a condition 
precedent. Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 245 & 255 (1977); J. Murray, Murray on 
Contracts § 188, p. 366-67; "[i]f, when the time for the happening of a condition precedent 
arrives, it appears that the promise that is qualified by the condition cannot be performed by 
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the promisor, the general rule is that the condition is excused . . . If it is reasonably certain 
that the promisee will not receive that which is the contemplated exchange for the 
performance of the condition, there is every reason why he should not be required to perform 
the condition as a preliminary to the recovery of compensation for defeated expectations .. 
." Since the UGA stood ready and willing to enter into a 20 year lease extension, and since 
North Salt Lake refused to enter into the lease and thereafter evicted the UGA, the fact that 
the lease extension was not agreed to does not act as a condition precedent barring the UGA 
from seeking damages for its loss of the UGA Property. R. 223 & 24. 
3, The Second Addendum was an unenforceable agreement to agree. 
Even if a 20 year extension of the lease had to be in place before North Salt Lake had 
a duty to convey the lot, the terms of the 20 year extension would have been governed by the 
First Addendum which set out the exact amount of rent that was to be paid during the 20 
years. R.28. The second addendum, which allowed North Salt Lake to dictate the critical 
term of the amount of the monthly rent, was an unenforceable agreement to agree. Pingree 
v. The Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 1317,1321 (Utah 1976): Cottonwood Mall 
Co. v. Sine. 767 P.2d 499, 502 (Utah 1988); and Browns Shoe Fit Co. v. Olch. 955 P.2d 357, 
364 (Utah App. 1998). 
North Salt Lake argues that since the 20 year lease was a condition precedent, the trial 
court only needed to determine if the condition precedent had been met. North Salt Lake 
reasons that the Pingree line of cases does not invalidate the Second Addendum because the 
court did not need to fashion a lease agreement for the parties even though the critical terms 
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of the lease agreement, such as the amount of rent, were missing from the Second 
Addendum. North Salt Lake concludes that the terms of the 20 year lease were unimportant, 
that the UGA simply had to enter into a lease on such terms that North Salt Lake dictated. 
North Salt Lake supports this conclusion by several cases from other states that hold that a 
clause requiring one party to be "satisfied" with a required condition precedent is enforceable 
and not an illusory agreement to agree.6 
The requirement of a 20 year extension in the Second Addendum was not a 
"satisfaction" requirement. It required the UGA to agree to whatever rent that North Salt 
Lake wanted to charge for the 20 year extension of the lease. This would have given North 
Salt Lake the unilateral power to frustrate the UGA's right to the building lot by negotiating 
an excessive rent and would have effectively terminated the lease. Courts will construe 
contracts so that one party does not have such an unilateral right of termination. Resource 
Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Co., Inc.. 706 P.2d 1028, 1037 (Utah 
1985). 
In addition, the "satisfaction" line of cases cited by North Salt Lake would require the 
trial court to determine if the City was being reasonable in its determination of whether the 
condition precedent had been met. This meant that the court would have to investigate 
whether North Salt Lake was asking a reasonable rent for the 20 year extension of the lease. 
In doing so, the trial court would run head on into the prohibition of the Pingree line of cases 
6
 These cases are Mattei v. Hopper, 330 P.2d 625 (Cal. 1958); Western Hills, Oregon, Ltd 
v. Pfau, 508 P.2d 201 (Or. 1973); and Omni Group, Inc. v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 645 P. 2d 
727 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982). 
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and be required to determine the dollar amount of "reasonable rent." The Second Addendum 
was simply an unenforceable agreement to agree.7 
4. The UGA timely elected a 20 year lease and was precluded from entering 
into such a lease by the actions of North Salt Lake. 
North Salt Lake argues that if the Second Addendum was not enforceable, the UGA 
failed to strictly abide by the terms of the First Addendum by entering into a 20 year lease 
extension at a set rate of rent before the original period of the Agreement expired. The City 
reasons that it had no duty to convey the building lot until this election was made and the 
UGA did not make the election before the original period of the lease expired. There are 
several problems with this argument. 
a. The UGA elected the 20 year lease extension but was precluded 
from completing the extension of the lease by the actions of North 
Salt Lake. 
Before the initial period of the lease expired, the parties discovered that North Salt 
7
 Since the Second Addendum was unenforceable, the court should fall back to the 
First Addendum and use the set rent from that agreement in place of the unenforceable 
term of the Second Addendum. Corbin discusses this doctrine that if a subsequent 
contract is void, or voided, because of fraud, infancy, or other reasons making the 
contract unenforceable, the prior agreement, that does not have the defect, becomes 
enforceable. Corbin on Contracts, § 1293 (1999 Cum Supp.). See also 17 Am. Jur. 2d 
Contracts § 513; Indiana Flooring Co. v. Grand Rapids Trust Co., 20 F.2d 63, 65 (6th Cir. 
1927); Timely Products. Inc. v. Costanzo. 465 F.Supp. 91, 98 (D.Conn. 1979); Spellman 
v. Ruhde, 137 N.W.2d 425, 428 (Wis. 1965); and Travelers Insurance Company v. Carey, 
180 N.W.2d 68, 72 (Mich. Ct. of App. 1970). 
This concept was discussed by the Utah Court of Appeals in Republic Group, Inc. 
v. Won-Door Corp.. 883 P.2d 285, 291 & 293 (Utah App. 1994). In Won-Door. the 
Court of Appeals replaced the unenforceable agreement with another agreement between 
the parties that addressed the same subject since the other agreement was a valid and 
enforceable contract. 
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Lake could not perform the most important term of the 20 year extension and convey fee title 
in the building lot. R. 527 and letters between the parties, trial exhibits 7 -13 . Before the 
expiration of the initial term of the lease, the UGA made it clear that it wanted the UGA 
Property and was ready and willing to sign a 20 year extension. R. 527. Because of the 
problem caused by North Salt Lake's inability to convey the fee title in the Property, the 
parties entered into negotiations. R. 527. During these negotiations, the UGA advised North 
Salt Lake that it stood willing and ready to sign a 20 year extension for the rent provided in 
the First Addendum and that it expected the City to convey the building lot. R. 527 and UGA 
letter of December 8,1999, trial exhibit 13. North Salt Lake responded by evicting the UGA. 
R. 528 and eviction notice, trial exhibit 15. 
b. The anticipatory breach of North Salt Lake precluded the need of 
the UGA to execute such an extension. 
The argument that North Salt Lake did not need to convey the UGA Property because 
the UGA did not execute a twenty year extension ignores the fact that an important part of 
the consideration for the twenty year lease was the right to the UGA Property. The UGA was 
absolved from entering into the lease because of the anticipatory breach of North Salt Lake, 
as argued above. 
c. North Salt Lake's argument was raised for the first time on appeal. 
The argument that the UGA did not execute a 20 year lease extension within the time 
requirements of the agreement is raised for the first time on appeal. North Salt Lake is 
precluded from making this argument. State v. Emmett 839 P.2d 781, 783-84 (Utah 1992); 
and State v. Matsamas. 808 P.2d 1948, 1052-53 (Utah 1991). 
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F. The Trial Court did not Err in its Calculation of Damages. 
The trial court awarded the UGA the value of the UGA Property that was lost when 
North Salt Lake could not convey fee title in the Property. This value was $158,441.00. 
North Salt Lake argues that the court should have deducted the present value of the 20 years 
of lease payments that the UGA did not pay to North Salt Lake. 
The UGA had the right to a 20 year lease at the rent set in the First Addendum and the 
right to the UGA building lot. North Salt Lake breached the Agreement by refusing to 
convey fee title in the building lot, by refusing to enter into a 20 year extension of the lease 
and by evicting the UGA. The UGA had the right to sue for loss of its expectation of 
receiving the building lot. The measure of damages for this loss was the fair market value 
of the lot. The UGA also had the right to sue for the loss of the 20 year extension. The 
measure of damages for loss of the extension of the lease would have been the difference 
between what the UGA had to pay for similar replacement offices and what it would have 
paid North Salt Lake under the lease. 
Contrary to the argument of North Salt Lake, the UGA did not receive a windfall by 
the judgment. The UGA still had to pay rent for its corporate offices, albeit to another 
landlord because North Salt Lake evicted the UGA. The UGA received the benefit of the 
building lot only because the trial court awarded a judgment for the fair market value of the 
lot. This was the very position for which the UGA contracted. 
Contrary to the argument of North Salt Lake, it has not had to pay more than it 
contracted to pay. It paid for the building lot, not by purchasing the lot and conveying it to 
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the UGA under the contract, but by the judgment awarded against it. It has continued to 
collect rent for the office space, not from the UGA because of the eviction, but from the other 
tenants who have moved into the space. This was the very position for which North Salt 
Lake contracted.8 
Upon anticipatory breach, a party can treat the contract as broken and sue for 
damages. Hurwitz v. David K. Richards Co., 436 P.2d at 796. The proper measure of 
damages for breach of contract is the amount necessary to place the nonbreaching party in 
as good of a position as if the contract had been performed. Mahmood v. Ross, 990 P.2d 933, 
941 (Utah 1999); Alexander v. Brown. 646 P.2d 692,695 (Utah 1982); and Keller v. Deseret 
Mortuary Co., 455 P. 2d 197, 198 (Utah 1969). The trial court's award of the $158,441.00 
fair market value of the building lot should be upheld. 
G. The Trial Court Erred in Declining to Award the UGA its Costs of Moving After 
being Evicted by North Salt Lake. 
North Salt Lake evicted the UGA even though the UGA stood ready and willing to 
sign a 20 year lease extension consistent with the terms of the First Addendum. North Salt 
Lake evicted the UGA because the City could not perform its contractual duty and convey 
the building lot and the UGA was demanding conveyance of the lot. The eviction breached 
the UGA's right to a 20 year extension. When it was evicted, the UGA incurred costs and 
expenses to move its offices. R. 528. These costs and expenses included moving expenses 
of $4,087.27, as set forth on the statements from Mesa Moving and Storage and Midwest 
8
 Actually, North Salt Lake is in a better position because it leased the office space 
to the tenants that replaced the UGA for a higher rate of rent. 
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Office. Trial exhibit 19. They included the cost of moving the telephone system in the 
amount of $2,102.69, which is set forth within the statements from Western 
Communications. Trial exhibit 19. They also included the cost of printing new stationary, 
envelopes, cards and other necessary items with a new address for the UGA for $4,815.53, 
as set forth in the statements from Production Graphics. Trial exhibit 19. 
These costs and expenses total $11,005.49 and would not have been incurred if the 
UGA had been allowed to have the benefit of its right to the 20 year extension. In order to 
put the UGA in the same position that it would have enjoyed had the contract been performed 
by North Salt Lake, the trial court should have awarded these costs and expenses to the UGA. 
Alexander v. Brown. 646 P.2d at 695. They were fully supported by testimony, canceled 
checks and bills from the moving company, telephone company and printer. The existence 
and amount of the damages were certain and not speculative. The trial court committed error 
by not awarding these damages.9 
The reason that the trial court did not award these damages is because it concluded 
that the UGA had a duty to mitigate its damages by signing a 20 year lease extension without 
the conveyance of the building lot and then suing North Salt Lake for the value of the lot. 
R. 443-45. The trial court reached this conclusion even though it also concluded that the City 
breached a very important obligation under the contract, its duty to convey the building lot. 
9
 The UGA also sought damages for the wages of its employees involved in the 
moving of the offices and the value of improvements to the offices left behind. The trial 
court concluded that these damages were speculative and uncertain. The UGA agrees 
with this conclusion, but does not agree with the conclusion that it failed to mitigate its 
damages, thus losing its hard costs of moving, such as the cost of the moving company, 
the telephone company and the printer. 
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The UGA had no duty to mitigate its damages by negotiating with the developer to 
convey the building lot without the deed restrictions and by negotiating the additional 1,207 
square feet that was never owned by the City. North Salt Lake agreed to convey clear, fee 
title in an 18, 975 square foot lot, not a 17,768 square foot lot with restrictions that made it 
impossible to resale the lot. North Salt Lake was fully aware of the consequences of its 
actions caused by its failure to convey the lot and its eviction of the UGA. North Salt Lake 
had the same opportunity as the UGA to mitigate the damages by negotiating with the 
developer to obtain clear, fee title in the correct size of lot. North Salt Lake had the same 
opportunity as the UGA to limit the damages by not evicting the UGA. Yet, the City chose 
to not negotiate with the developer and chose to evict the UGA. These conscious choices 
caused the damages of loss of the building lot and the expenses of moving the UGA's 
offices. 
Where the breaching party has the same opportunity to perform the contract and the 
same knowledge of the consequences of nonperformance as the party to whom the 
contractual duty is owed, the breaching party cannot complain about the failure of the latter 
to perform his contractual duty. Alexander v. Brown, 646 P.2d at 695. The UGA had no 
duty to mitigate the damages of the costs of moving its offices by signing a 20 year lease 
without the bargained for benefit of clear, fee title in the building lot. The trial court's 
decision to not award the UGA its $11,005.49 of moving costs was clear error and the court 
should reverse this portion of the decision and award these costs, plus interest at the 
prejudgment and postjudgment rates from the date of the eviction, December, 12, 1999. 
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Further, mitigation of damages is an affirmative defense. John Call Engineering v. 
Manti City Corp., 795 P.2d 678, 682 (Utah App. 1990). This defense was not pled in the 
defendants' answer or raised by motion. The trial court based this portion of its decision on 
an affirmative defense that was not pled by the defendants or reasonably anticipated by the 
UGA. This defense should not have been considered. Golding v. Ashley Central Irrigation, 
Ca, 793 P.2d at 899. 
H. The Court Could Uphold the Decision of the Trial Court Based upon Breach of 
the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. 
The UGA also alleged breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the 
Complaint. The essence of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is that every party 
must act reasonably, not arbitrarily, towards the other party to the contract so as not to 
deprive the other party of the benefits of the contract. Resource Management Co. v. Weston 
Ranch and Livestock Co., 706 P.2d at 1037; Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isorru 657 
P.2d293, 311 (Utah 1982); and Ted R. Brown Assoc, v. Carnes Corp., 753 P.2d964, 970 
(Utah App. 1988). 
North Salt Lake did not act reasonably towards the UGA. The right to the UGA 
Property was clearly an important part of the agreement between the parties. North Salt Lake 
represented that it owned the lot in fee title. It did not. When this fact was discovered, North 
Salt Lake did not act reasonably. It should have obtained the lot from the developer and 
conveyed the lot to the UGA or paid the fair market value of the lot to the UGA if the 
developer refused to convey fee title to the lot. At the same time the parties should have 
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agreed to the twenty year lease extension with the rent increases outlined in the First 
Addendum. Instead, North Salt Lake refused to deal with the developer, told the UGA that 
it had to solve the problem with the developer or take the building lot with the lesser square 
footage and the use restrictions that gutted all of the value from the lot, or face being evicted. 
When the UGA stood its ground and demanded that North Salt Lake honor its contractual 
obligations and convey fee title in the lot, the City evicted the UGA. This was not reasonable 
behavior and destroyed the UGA's right to the building lot and its right to a 20 year lease 
extension. The court could uphold the decision of the trial court based upon the breach of 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by North Salt Lake. 
Conclusion 
The Court should uphold the judgment of the trial court in the amount of the fair 
market value of the building lot, $158,441.00; modify the judgment by awarding the UGA 
its $11,005.49 in moving costs and expenses, plus prejudgment and postjudgment interest 
from the date of the eviction, December 31, 1999; and remand the case to the trial court to 
determine the attorney's fees, costs and litigation expenses incurred in this appeal (the 
written agreements contain attorney fee provisions), which should be added to the judgment. 
Dated the 19th day of June, 2002. 
Hoole & King 
Lester A. Perry 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross-Appellant 
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